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Understanding the factors that affect farmers’ irrigation decisions is critical for a 
better groundwater management. This study addresses the question of how economic, 
agronomic, and policy variables affect the timing of irrigation adoption in Nebraska. The key 
contribution of this paper is to identify farmers’ strategic responses to a particular type of 
policy intervention, a moratorium on well drilling. Our results estimate how farmers respond 
when a moratorium is announced but not enforced yet, and when neighboring areas 
implement a moratorium, which we refer as pre-regulation effect and policy spillover effect, 
respectively. Results show that farmers are more likely to drill a new irrigation well at least 
one year before the moratorium is implemented due to concerns about future constraints on 
water use, and the probability increases by 62%. We also find strong evidence that as any of 
the neighboring NRDs enforces a moratorium, the probability of drilling a new well in a 
given NRD increased by 77%. Unsurprisingly, the probability of drilling a well significantly 
decreased by 21% after the moratorium is implemented.  
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1     Introduction 
 
The US High Plains aquifer, one of the largest freshwater aquifer systems in the world, 
continues to decline, threatening the long-term viability of an irrigation-based economy. As 
the most intensively used aquifer in the United States, the High Plains aquifer provides 30% 
of the total withdrawals from all aquifers for irrigation (Sophocleous, 2010). More 
importantly, it also provides drinking water to 82% of the people within the boundaries 
according to both the 1990 census and 2000 census (Sophocleous, 2010). The aquifer system 
including the Ogallala and Equus Beds underlies parts of eight US states, and mostly 
underlies the three states: Nebraska has 65% of the aquifer’s volume, Texas has 12% and 
Kansas has 10% (Peck, 2007). The increasing demand for groundwater resources when the 
aquifer is being extracted at rates in excess of recharge has gained major attention on 
groundwater use management. The problem that the regions are facing has prompted each 
state government to regulate groundwater use for sustainability. For example, the 
establishment of minimum desirable stream flows in Kansas and instream flow requirements 
in Texas aim at protecting stream flows and maintaining water levels. Such regulations have 
made some progresses, but piecemeal arrangements for managing the supplies and quality of 
water are inadequate to meet the water challenges of the future (Sophocleous, 2010). Thus, 
identifying and understanding the factors that affect farmers’ irrigation decisions and 
examining the effectiveness of current policies are important for a better groundwater 
management.  
Due to the nature of state-level autonomy in managing water allocations, each state 
employs different groundwater management policies that best serve their own needs for water 
resources. For instance, the local districts exercise almost sole authority to establish 
groundwater control in Nebraska and Texas (Stephenson, 1996). Nebraska is one of the most  
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groundwater-rich states in the United States. Around 88% of residents rely on groundwater as 
their source of drinking water, and the majority of groundwater is used for irrigation (2017 
Nebraska Groundwater Quality Monitoring Report). Thus, Nebraska has a long history of 
analyzing the local officials’ rule-making behaviors and identifying a set of factors that 
contribute to the development of groundwater management system (Stephenson, 1996).  
The paper addresses the question about how one type of groundwater policy (a well 
drilling moratorium) affects the timing of a farmer’s decision to invest in a new irrigation 
well. Previous studies show that the early well drilling decisions made by farmers are mainly 
due to the development and diffusion of irrigation technologies (Aiken 1980; Stephenson, 
1996; Sampson and Perry, 2018). With no regulations on groundwater use, this decision is 
also primarily determined by economic, agronomic, and climate factors. With restrictions 
such as well drilling moratoria, we would observe changes in farmers’ irrigation adoption 
decisions. If a moratorium is perfectly enforced and passed with no warning, we would not 
expect to observe any strategic responses toward the policy intervention. However, policies 
are typically debated for a period before they are enacted, and policy heterogeneity across the 
state allow us to identify how farmers respond to the moratorium policy. Producers may 
choose to invest in an irrigation well if a moratorium is announced but not enforced yet since 
they expect that they will not be able to drill a well in the future. Producers may also respond 
to a moratorium in a neighboring region by drilling a new well, because they are concerned 
about an expansion of such regulation to their own region in the future. Thus, we expect an 
increasing number of well drilling before the policy implementation and also when any of the 
neighboring NRDs implements a moratorium. 
The key contribution of this paper is to analyze farmers’ strategic responses in terms 
of policy changes using survival analysis. The results show that farmers are 62% more likely 
to drill a new irrigation well at least one year before the moratorium is implemented as 
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demonstrated by pre-policy dummy variable. We also find strong evidence that as 
neighboring NRDs enforce a moratorium, the probability of drilling a new well in a given 
NRD increased by 77%, as demonstrated by the neighboring NRDs dummy variable. The 
probability of drilling a well significantly decreased by 21% after the moratorium is 
implemented as demonstrated by post-policy dummy variable.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the institutional background 
about Nebraska groundwater management system. Section 3 reviews the previous literature 
on irrigation adoption decisions and the important factors to consider. Section 4 discusses the 
statistical methodology used for empirical analysis, and sources on data for each type of 
explanatory variable are followed in Section 5. Section 6 and Section 7 presents the results 
and discussion, followed by conclusion.  
 
2     Institutional Background in Nebraska 
 
During the period of 1950-1975, the quantity of groundwater used annually for irrigation in 
the western states increased from 18 to 56 million acre feet, which accordingly led to 
significant groundwater mining in the High Plains regions from Texas to Nebraska (Aiken, 
1980). Figure 1 shows distribution of well registrations between 1950 and 2017 in nine NRDs 
in Nebraska where most irrigation wells were drilled. The 1957 Well Registration Statute 
required that all irrigation wells be registered with the Department of Water Resource 
(DWR), which is illustrated by the large number of well registrations in 1957. Until 1975, the 
state of Nebraska almost exclusively relied on a “reasonable use doctrine”, which granted a 
nearly unlimited pumping privilege to all overlying landowners. With the agricultural  
technological development in the 1970s, such as the widespread use of center pivot irrigation 
technology, the common law principle was not effective at limiting groundwater use, thus led 
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to significant reductions in groundwater levels in several regions in Nebraska (Stephenson, 
1996).  
The state of Nebraska developed a unique system of 23 Natural Resource Districts 
(NRDs) to manage its groundwater resources, with boundaries based on river basins. The 
introduction of NRDs in Nebraska started in 1969 and was officially established in 1972, 
with responsibilities including allocating water, augmenting surface water, requiring flow 
meters, instituting well drilling moratoria, requiring water use reports and restricting the 
expansion of irrigated acres (Nebraska Natural Resources Districts).  
The Upper Republican NRD (URNRD), as one of the NRDs with the most severe 
water level declines, was designated as the first groundwater water control area in 1977 due 
to its uncontrolled groundwater use and inadequate water supply (Aiken, 1980). As shown in 
Figure 2, number of wells in the four NRDs along Republican River Basin during 1960-1980 
show consistent trends. Besides the technological advances, farmers’ well-drilling decision is 
also affected by social factors. For example, energy crisis due to the embargo on oil by the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1970s, which led to a 
reduction in number of new irrigation wells during the period (Powell and Landers, 1979). 
Moreover, increased production and productivity also led to overproduction, groundwater use 
and land use. Therefore, Nebraska’ agricultural sector mainly depended on government farm 
programs, which further caused farm credit crisis due to the heavy buildup of indebtedness 
and record-high interest rates that drove many farmers out of business, as indicated by the 
decreasing number of irrigation wells in the 1980s (Johnson, 1986).  
Besides social factors, URNRD was the first NRD that implemented a complete well 
drilling moratorium in 1997 to further manage the severe water level declines in the region. 
With the implementation of the moratorium, farmers could no longer drill a new irrigation 
well at their own advantage. New well registrations in the URNRD have declined and 
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remained at a low level since mid 1990s, which provided insightful evidence for the 
effectiveness of a well drilling moratorium on limiting new irrigation wells and reducing 
water-level declining rate.  
For our analysis, we focus on the period between 1995 and 2017, since this period is 
after the technology-driven expansion in the 1960s and 1970s, and when groundwater 
regulations started to become common in the region. The study region includes the nine 
NRDs along Republican River Basin (RRB), Platte River Basin (PRB), and Blue River Basin 
(BRB), which are Lower Republican NRD, Middle Republican NRD, Upper Republican 
NRD, Tri-Basin NRD, Central Platte NRD, South Platte NRD, Twin Platte NRD, Little Blue 
NRD and Upper Big Blue NRD as highlighted in Figure 3. There are some fluctuations in the 
number of wells implemented each year in the nine NRDs, but the overall number of wells in 
the region is increasing between 1995 and 2017 as illustrated in Figure 4. Based on the 
observations for the regions and the variations in the timing of implementation of well 
drilling moratorium in each NRD, we are able to analyze how well drilling moratoria, by 
either a farmer’s own NRD or a neighboring NRD, affect the decision to drill an irrigation 
well. Conducting analyses on a larger scale of observations provide critical insights on how 
to design an appropriate policy to maintain a sustainable water supply in the long run.  
 
 
3     Literature review and theoretical framework 
 
There is extensive literature that examine the factors determining farmers’ irrigation 
technology decisions, such as when to start irrigating or when to invest in modern irrigation 
systems. These literature has iterated the important factors to consider in explaining farmers’ 
adoption decisions in agricultural irrigation (Caswell and Zilberman, 1986; Lichtenberg, 
1989; Negri and Brooks, 1990; Green et.al.,1996; Carey and Zilberman, 2002). Another 
  
 
6 
 
 
branch of literature focuses on modeling a farmer’s decision as a discrete choice, with 
adoption measured at a single point in time. In most cases, the literature uses field-level or 
farm-level data to empirically test the significance of each independent variables, and the 
most common method is logit or probit models (Lichtenberg, 1989; Westra and Olson, 1997; 
Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007; Sampson and Perry, 2018). An extension of this branch is to 
consider farmers’ adoption decision as a dynamic process in which farmers learn about a 
technology or an agricultural practice and decide to adopt when the expected profit is 
positive. These results predict not only whether people adopt an irrigation technology, but 
also when a farmer chooses to adopt. A common method used in these papers is 
survival/duration analysis (Burton et. al., 2003; Alcon, 2011; Savage, 2011). However, most 
of the studies model the adoption process as a discrete decision that occurs at a point of time, 
thus commonly employ a probit/logit model, and literature on agricultural irrigation decisions 
that uses survival/duration analysis is limited.  
Caswell and Zilberman (1986) provide fundamental explanations on the variables that 
determine farmers’ irrigation decisions. Land quality and well depth are the two major factors 
in farmers’ adoption decisions. More specifically, water-holding capacity is a more direct 
indicator of soil quality and is directly associated with the irrigation effectiveness of the 
chosen irrigation technology. Well depth affects farmers’ decisions because it affects the cost 
of pumping groundwater. The variations in land quality and well depth are critical to 
understand adoption and diffusion patterns. Results show that modern technology tends to 
increase yield and save water in most cases, and is most likely to be utilized on low quality 
land with a high depth to groundwater.   
Carey and Zilberman (2002) develop a stochastic dynamic model to examine farmers’ 
technology adoption decisions under uncertainty. The study incorporates farm characteristics 
that affect efficiency gains associated with investment decisions, such as crop type, soil type, 
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and land slope. The paper concludes that farmers will not invest in modern technologies 
unless the expected present value of investment exceeds the cost by a potentially large hurdle 
rate. In addition, the paper finds a counterintuitive result that the introduction of a water 
market, which would mitigate the uncertain about water supply, actually decreases 
technology adoption incentives for some farms. This result serves an important insight for 
farmers’ irrigation decisions in which farmers require some certainty in water supply before 
adopting a new technology.  
Negri and Brooks (1990) employ a discrete choice model to estimate the determinants 
of irrigation technology choice using a national cross section of farm-level data. The choice 
of a specific irrigation technology varies in terms of physical and economic attributes of the 
farm. The study confirms the importance of land quality and water cost in determining 
technology choice. As the price of water increases, the probability of adopting water-saving 
technology increases. Soil characteristics are included as dummy variables to classify spoil 
productivity and specific climate variables are generated as proxies for evaporation. In both 
technology choice models, soil characteristics and climate dominate farmers’ selection 
probabilities.  
 Green et.al (1996) use a microparameter approach when explaining irrigation 
technology choices and point out that crop type plays an important role in technology choice, 
as high-value crops that require specialized capital affect the probability of specific irrigation 
technology. Moreover, water price is not the most important factor governing irrigation 
technology adoptions, and the results on water price variable are not robust in all cases, 
because the study areas focuses on arid and hot districts where irrigation water is already 
relatively high. Physical and agronomic characteristics are significant in determining farmers’ 
adoption decisions, which is consistent with the results from other literature.  
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Knowler and Bradshaw (2007) review and synthesize 31 recent papers on farmers 
adoption of conservation agriculture to identify important independent variables to explain 
adoption. The paper summarizes four categories of factors that affect farmers’ decisions: 
farm and farmers characteristics, biophysical, financial, and other economic factors. Though 
these factors are key determinants in each individual study, it is less likely to conclude that 
there universal variables to regularly explain the decision across analyses. The paper also 
highlights the most commonly used econometric approaches to analyze such decisions, which 
are OLS, probit or logit, random effects GLS.  
 Lichtenberg (1989) develops a framework that incorporates land quality into an 
empirical study to examines the interactions between land quality, crop choice, technological 
change and cropping patterns change. The paper empirically tests the framework using 
observations in western Nebraska during 1966-80 using a multinomial logit model. The study 
finds that land quality (measured using available water capacity and topography) has been 
one of the key determinants of cropping patterns and technology choice in the study region.  
Westra and Olson (1997) use logit analysis to understand why farmers with similar 
soil type make different decisions about adopting a certain production practices (e.g., 
conservation tillage). The study uses data from two Minnesota counties, and includes factors 
such as climate, farmers and farm characteristics, geographic locations, and sources of 
information on conservation tillage practices. Results show that farmers’ perceptions about 
such practices is a key determinant on whether to adopt it. Economic factors, farmers’ ability 
and willingness factors, and farm sizes are the most critical factors in an adoption decision.  
 Sampson and Perry (2018) analyze spatial peer effects in acquisition of groundwater 
rights for agricultural irrigation using well-location from Kansas. The paper incorporates 
factors found to be significant in predicting technology adoption decisions, such as soil 
characteristics, market prices for corn and wheat, climate data for the period of 1950-2014. 
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The results demonstrate that an increase in the cumulative number of adopters in the closest 
geographic regions increases the probability of groundwater rights adoption with diminishing 
effect. Moreover, as the average distance to neighbors increases, the probability of 
groundwater rights acquisition decreases. In addition, commodity prices and climate 
variables also affect the decisions to acquire groundwater rights.  
Burton et. al.(2003) employ duration analysis to model the adoption of organic 
horticultural technology in the United Kingdom using economic and non-economic 
determinants. This is one of the first studies to use duration analysis in an analysis of 
agricultural technology. The paper aims to identify the sign and magnitude of the effects of 
explanatory variables (i.e., farm and farmers characteristics, cropping patterns, economic 
factors, sources of information and attitudes to environmental issues) on the length of time 
farmers remain non-adopters. Results highlight the significant advantages of duration 
analysis over conventional approaches, such as probit or logit model.  
Alcon (2011) employs duration analysis when studying farmers’ adoption decisions 
of drip irrigation based on observations from southeastern Spain. The objective is to analyze 
the magnitude and sign of adoption determinants. The paper highlights the significance of 
using duration analysis and its great advantages over logit or probit model because it 
facilitates the study of both cross-section and time-dependent variables. Among other 
significant variables, water availability increases the adoption speed for drip irrigation, as 
more water allotment in a year provides reassurance of the profitability of technology 
investment. Moreover, farmers with access to groundwater are more likely to adopt modern 
technology than those without groundwater use. Both variables indicate that the farmers 
would require some certainty in water supply before investing in a modern technology.   
Using data from the Republican River Basin (RRB) NRDs in Nebraska, Savage 
(2011) employs duration analysis to study how individual irrigation decisions are affected by 
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physical heterogeneity and a spatial pumping externality. Results show that land quality, well 
yield, and depth to groundwater significantly affect farmers’ investment decisions. One of the 
main contributions of this paper is the finding that relative profitability of irrigation is non-
monotonic in land quality, in which the probability of adoption is greater on intermediate 
quality land relative to high quality land, but is less on low quality land relative to high 
quality land. The paper also demonstrates that when adequately controlling for endogeneity 
(something that previous studies failed to do), the relationship between farmers’ irrigation 
behaviors and spatial externalities is found to be weak in this study region.  
There is literature on farmers’ preemptive behaviors in terms of policy 
implementations. List et.al.(2006) focus on exploring the extent to which the U.S. 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) has altered land development patterns, especially when most 
of the species listed on ESA are found in private land. Landowners can lose the development 
rights over the land if it is valuable to the listed species under ESA. Therefore, it is expected 
to observe a preemptive act from landowners to avoid such regulation, so that we expect a 
shift in the timing of development activities by the landowners. Based on observations from 
Arizona, empirical results show that there is a significant acceleration of development 
directly after several events deemed likely to raise fears among owners of habitat land.  
Langpap et.al.(2017) review the recent literature regarding to the effectiveness of the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA). More than two-thirds of listed species under ESA inhabit 
only private land. Therefore, decisions on listing of species have caused conflicts between 
promoting species preservation and restricting economic activities, because it involves in 
more governmental control over grazing, irrigation, construction and energy development. As 
a result, such restrictions on land use provide farmers little incentive to maintain or improve 
habitat and may destroy it to preempt regulation. The paper uses survey and observational 
data to examine the effects of incentive programs and results suggest that perceived 
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likelihood of ESA regulation did not have a significant impact on landowners’ decision to 
participate in a conservation program. While perverse incentives are real, it is possible to 
mitigate such preemptive behaviors by proper designed incentive programs.  
 
4     Survival Analysis 
 
 
In this study, we use a survival analysis to examine farmers’ well-drilling decisions. Survival 
analysis is the study of how long an individual survives in a certain state, and what factors 
affect the decision to leave that state. In our context, we assume that all producers are initially 
farming with a dryland system, and we analyze how long a producer survives as a dryland 
producer before choosing to invest in an irrigation well.  
Formally, two key ways of specifying a survival distribution are the survival function 
and the hazard function (Moore, 2016). The simple survival function is demonstrated as 
follows:   
 𝑆𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑃𝑟(𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡𝑖|𝑇𝑖 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖𝑡) 
Which defines the probability that the random variable T exceeds t, where 𝑇𝑖 is a discrete 
random variable representing the time that parcel i adopts irrigated production. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the set 
of explanatory variables for parcel i at time t. The hazard function specifies the instantaneous 
failure rate at T=t, which is expressed as: 
   ℎ𝑖(𝑡) =  𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑑𝑡→0
𝑝𝑟(𝑡≤𝑇𝑖<𝑡+𝑑𝑡|𝑇𝑖≥𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
 = 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑎𝑡→0
 
𝐹(𝑡+𝑑𝑡)−𝐹(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡(1−𝐹(𝑡))
 = 
𝑓𝑖(𝑡)
𝑆𝑖(𝑡)
 
ℎ𝑖(𝑡) defines the probability of a farmer remains in dryland production at T=t, conditional 
upon survival to time t, and decides to switch to irrigated farming in the next interval of time. 
𝐹𝑖(𝑡) is the cumulative density function, and 𝑓𝑖(𝑡) is the continuous density function of the 
random variable t. These functions are defined as:  
  
 
12 
 
 
𝐹𝑖(𝑡)  = ∫ 𝑓(𝑠)𝑑𝑠
𝑡
0
= Pr(Ti ≤ 𝑡) = 1-𝑆𝑖(𝑡) 
𝑓𝑖(𝑡) = -
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
𝑆𝑖(𝑡) =  
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
 𝐹𝑖(𝑡)   
The relationship between these functions are defined. In addition, while other functional  
relationships between the proportional hazards and covariates are possible, the most widely 
used model is proportional hazard model, which decomposes the hazard into a baseline 
component and a component depends on individual covariates. There are many appropriate 
parametric specifications for the distribution of survival data to define the baseline survival 
function, such as exponential and Weibull distributions. However, parametric distributions 
require strong assumptions about form of the underlying survival distribution, thus Cox 
proportional hazards model is the most common regression modeling framework in practice, 
which allows for an unspecified baseline survival distribution (Moore, 2016). The Cox 
proportional hazards model demonstrates the relationship between covariates and the hazard 
of experiencing an event, and employs a partial likelihood approach to estimate the model 
parameters (Thomas and Reyes, 2014). The practical reason for the advantage of using the 
Cox proportional model is that it allows for time-dependent covariates in the case where such 
variables are expected to affect farmers’ irrigation decisions.  
Therefore, we use time-to-event data to model farmers’ irrigation decisions based on 
the Cox proportional hazards model. The dataset includes initial starting year, ending year, 
event occurrence(i.e., the irrigation adoption decision), and also explanatory variables that 
include both time-fixed and time-varying variables. The Cox proportional hazards model 
requires a counting process style of dataset, which expands the dataset from one record-per-
well to one record-per-interval between each event time for each individual observation. The  
model then compares the current covariate values of the subject who had the event and the 
current values of all others who were at risk at that time at each event time (Therneau 
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et.al.,2018). The Cox proportional hazards model in terms of hazard functions is 
demonstrated as 
   h1(t) = h0(t) exp(X + 𝑌
𝑇𝑌) 
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard function with all the covariates equal to 0, X and Y are 
vectors of time-fixed and time-varying covariates, respectively.  
The effect of one unit increase in y given a common X is  
ℎ1(t|Y=y+1,X)
 ℎ0(t|Y=y,X)
 = exp() 
The primary interest of this study is to determine the factors that affect a farmer’s 
decision to drill a new well (i.e., switch from dryland to irrigated farming), with a particular 
interest in the effect of policy variables. The dependent variable is the duration measured by 
the number of years farmers remain in dryland production. The data includes all the 
observations up to the year when an irrigation well is drilled, and the rest of the observations 
are dropped.  
 
5     Data 
 
 
 
Our data covers the southwestern and southcentral portions of Nebraska as displayed in 
Figure 3. Our unit of analysis is a quarter section of land, which is a 0.5 mile square.1 A 
quarter section is the most typical size of a field, and is the standard size for a center pivot 
irrigation system. The quarter sections included in the study are those units that have not yet 
implemented an irrigation well by 1995, which is equivalent to 70% of the quarter sections in 
the nine NRDs. The full available spatial information on irrigation wells are from the 
                                                 
1 Sections refer to the sections in the U.S. Public Land Survey System. Each section is one square 
mile. 
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Nebraska Department of Natural Resources. We filter out the wells that are not for irrigation 
use, leaving  69,415 irrigation wells in the nine NRDs. As described previously, the nine 
NRDs contain the majority of irrigation wells in Nebraska, and are the areas with the most 
activity in groundwater policy. The dependent variable is the duration until an irrigation well 
is drilled on the quarter section, thus the timing when a farmer adopts irrigation. Since we are 
particularly interested in well moratoria policies, we mainly focus on the period of 1995-
2017. The starting time of 1995 is chosen because it is shortly before the first moratorium 
policy was enacted in the study area. The exit time is the year an irrigation well is 
implemented. In practice, some individuals may not adopt irrigation by the end of the 
observation period, which is 2017, then the procedure is to right-censor those observations in 
2017. The maximum duration is thus 23 years.  
 In particular, survival analysis assumes that there is only one well in each quarter 
section, and it captures the probability of a well gets implemented in each quarter section in 
terms of the explanatory variables included. However, our well spatial data show that there 
are 45% of the quarter sections with multiple wells. In some cases, multiple wells are 
registered in the same year, while other cases have new wells added without an existing well 
deactivated. Thus, we only keep the first well for each quarter section, which is appropriate 
given our research interest in explaining when a farmer switched from dryland to irrigated 
production. For the period of 1995-2017, there are 5,010 irrigation wells included for our 
regression analysis. There are registration and completion year recorded for each well, and 
they are not always the same. In cases where the years differ, we use the earlier date, as this 
is an indicator of the irrigation adoption decision.  
Previous research finds that soil characteristics are an important factor that determine 
farmers’ irrigation decisions (Caswell and Zilberman, 1986; Negri and Brooks, 1990). Soil 
characteristics are likely to affect irrigation effectiveness and profitability. Spatial soil data 
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are downloaded from USDA-SSURGO. Soil characteristics include sand and silt percent, 
slope, and available water capacity. The variables capture the main soil characteristics to 
measure the output productivity and irrigation efficiency. Monthly weather information is 
from PRISM climate data from Oregon State University. The grid cells analyzed are the 
standard PRISM 4km. Specifically, climate variables used in the study are monthly 
maximum temperature and total precipitation. These variables affect yields and associated 
profits with irrigated production (Negri and Brooks, 1990; Green et al, 1996; Sampson and 
Perry, 2018). Both SSURGO and PRISM data are spatial datasets, and are matched with the 
quarter sections of the nine NRDs. 
The economic variables are from USDA National Agricultural Statistic Service. We 
first obtain state-level crop prices and county-level yields. Time-series data for energy costs 
are not available at the county or district level for the state of Nebraska. State-level costs only 
capture variation across time but not across each individual quarter section. Thus, due to data 
availability, we use crop price and yields to calculate the county-level revenue differential 
between dryland and irrigated production for corn, which measures the marginal yield benefit 
of switching from dryland and irrigated farming. Prices are all in constant 2017 U.S. dollars 
using the Consumer Price Index.  
As for policy variables, the dates for the various moratorium are from each NRD’s 
Rules and Regulations and Integrated Management Plan documents. The Rules and 
Regulations document is required of all NRDs, and describes operating procedures and rules. 
The Integrated Management Plan is required of some NRDs based on the history and concern 
over groundwater depletion and groundwater-surface water connectivity. Based on the policy 
information, we generate three dummy variables related to the policy well drilling moratoria. 
Neighboring NRDs dummy variable is created to capture the policy spillover effect that if 
farmers’ decisions are affected by the policy implementation in their neighboring NRDs. For 
  
 
16 
 
 
this dummy variable, we assign 1 if any adjacent NRD has implemented a well drilling 
moratorium, and 0 otherwise if the site NRD has not implemented a moratorium. The pre-
policy dummy variable is to capture farmers’ preemptive behavior to drill a new well if a 
moratorium is announced but not yet implemented. A ‘1’ indicates one year prior to the 
actual implementation and a ‘0’ indicates all other years. Post-policy dummy variable 
indicates whether an observation occurs after a moratorium is implemented. If the 
moratorium is effective and enforced, this will have a significant negative effect on well 
drilling. However, the Board of Director for each NRD has considerable autonomy to permit 
new wells, even when a moratorium exists. Thus, we do not expect that implementation is 
perfect. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the econometric model.  
 
6     Results 
 
Recall that the dependent variable in survival analysis is the duration of time that farmers 
remain in dryland production until an irrigation well is drilled. The key variables of interest 
in this study are policy variables, which are neighboring NRDs dummy, pre-policy dummy 
and post-policy dummy. The variables are generated based on available information on the 
implementation years of well-drilling moratorium in the nine NRDs. Table 2 (1995-2017) 
reports the results of the survival model with NRD-fixed effect incorporated. The results 
show the relationship between each exogenous variable and the probability of well drilling 
for farmers within the nine NRDs. The coefficients demonstrate the proportional change in 
the hazard given a unit change in the exogenous variable. A positive coefficient implies a 
higher hazard associated with the variable, which tends to reduce time in dryland production, 
thus faster adoption. Column 3 in Table 2 shows the hazard ratio associated with each 
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variable. A hazard ratio that is greater than 1 implies a positive effect on farmers’ well-
drilling decisions.  
As illustrated in Figure 4, we observe an increasing number of well registrations at 
least a year before the policy implementation, and a decreasing trend for well drilling after  
the implementation. Results from Table 2 demonstrate expected sign of coefficients for the 
three policy variables, neighboring NRDs dummy, pre-policy dummy and post-policy dummy. 
Some of the NRDs still have significant well registrations after the well drilling moratorium 
was implemented, such as Central Platte, Little Blue, Tri-Basin and Upper Big Blue. These 
NRDs have partial moratoriums that only apply to some areas, but not to the full NRD. The 
coefficient of pre-policy dummy is positive and statistically significant, which means that pre-
policy dummy increases the hazards and reduces survival duration thus leads to a faster well 
drilling decision, comparing to those without policy implementation. The hazard ratio for 
pre-policy dummy is e0.365  = 1.6215, as the hazard ratio represented in Table 2, it indicates 
that the probability of drilling a new well is 62% greater than those NRDs without potential 
policy interventions. Similarly, the positive coefficient of neighboring NRDs dummy and its 
hazard ratio show that if a moratorium is implemented in an adjacent NRD, the probability of 
farmers drilling a new well increases by 77% due to the expectation of such policy to expand 
to their own NRD in the future. On the contrary, the coefficient on post-policy dummy is 
negative and statistically significant. The relationship shows that after an implementation of 
well drilling moratorium, the probability of drilling a well decreases by 21%.   
 Soil characteristics are captured by sand percentage, silt percentage, slope and 
available water capacity. The coefficients on sand percentage and silt percentage are 
positive and statistically significant. The proportion of each soil component indicate the 
specific type of soil characteristics that determine irrigation efficiency, thus increases the 
probability for adopting irrigation. The coefficient on sand percentage indicates that a one- 
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percent increase in sand percentage in soil component is associated with 3.6% higher chance 
of adopting irrigation. An additional increase in the organic matter increases the probability 
of drilling a new well due to a higher profit associated with irrigation production.  
 Some variables do not indicate expected relationship with farmers’ irrigation adoption 
decisions based on results from Table 2. For example, the coefficient on average maximum  
temperature is negative and statistically significant, which means that one unit increase in 
temperature is associated with 33% lower probability of drilling a new well. Higher summer 
temperature increases the water evaporation rates and reduces water application efficiency, 
thus it is associated with higher hazard; therefore, the coefficient on this variable is 
unexpected. The insignificant explanatory variables are somewhat expected, because farmers’ 
irrigation decisions in more recent period are dominant by the policy intervention on 
groundwater use, and depend less on soil characteristics, economic factors and climate 
variables. Recall that the locations included in the analysis are only those that have not 
already had well implementations by 1995. Thus, locations where the soil quality increases 
the net benefit of irrigation are likely to have already installed irrigation before 1995, so we 
do not observe significant impacts from the non-policy factors for this period.  
 
7     Baseline effect of Non-Policy Factors between 1960 and 1995 
 
 
In order to have a better understanding about the impacts that non-policy factors have on  
farmers’ irrigation decisions, we also analyze the data on wells with corresponding 
explanatory variables for the early period of 1960-1995 for the nine NRDs in Nebraska. The 
first traceable irrigation well was implemented in 1919, however, due to the lack of available 
data on the earlier period and the fact that wells were required to be officially registered in 
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1957, we focus on the observations after 1960. Thus, we have a total number of 18,745 
irrigation wells in the nine NRDs during 1960-1995, the distribution of well implementations 
per year is illustrated by Figure 6. The average well implementation per year is 520 between  
1960 and 1995 which is twice of the number drilled during the period of 1995-2017. We 
expect that all of the explanatory variables, such as climate variables, soil characteristics, and 
economic factors would have greater impacts on farmers’ irrigation decisions in the early 
period as they are the determinants for farmers’ irrigation decisions, particularly when the 
policy variables are not relevant in early years. The same econometric model is employed 
that is the survival analysis. Results are reported in Table 3.  
Results from Table 3 show the relationship between each exogenous variable and 
farmers’ irrigation decisions based on the observations from 1960 to 1995. In general, the 
sign of coefficients on non-policy factors demonstrate consistent relationships from the 
results in Table 2 (1995-2017). Specifically, all the coefficients on the economic, agronomic 
and climate variables are statistically significant, and the magnitude for each variable is also 
greater.  
Variables on soil characteristics are statistically significant on farmers irrigation 
decisions in early period during 1960-1995. Sand percentage and silt percentage in soil 
components illustrate that one-percent increase in the variables, the probability of farmers 
adopt irrigation increases by 2.8% and 2.9%, respectively. The coefficient on slope is 
negative and statistically significant, which reveals the importance of soil quality that one 
unit increase in soil slope would decrease the probability of drilling a new well by 0.4%. The 
coefficient on available water capacity is positive and statistically significant, which shows 
that higher land quality leads to a higher irrigation gain,  so it increases the probability of 
drilling a new well by 2.6%.  
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In addition, the coefficient on corn revenue differential is positive and statistically 
significant as expected. Corn is the most water intensive crop commonly grown in the region, 
an increase in corn revenue differential between dryland and irrigated land leads to a 0.14% 
higher probability of drilling a well due to the higher profits associated with irrigated 
production.  
However, the coefficient on precipitation is positive and statistically significant for 
the period of 1960-1995. The positive coefficient on precipitation means that as precipitation 
increases by one inch, it increases farmers’ probability of drilling a new irrigation well by 
4.7%. Comparing the climate trend and number of wells in Figure 6 and 7, during the period 
of 1970-1975, it shows that a negative relationship that as a decreasing precipitation trend is 
corresponding to an increase in number of wells. However, the significant decrease in well 
drilling after 1975 due to a more regulated groundwater pumping may cause the unexpected 
relationship between precipitation and farmers’ well drilling decisions for the early period.  
 
8     Conclusion 
 
Governmental interventions on groundwater use are considered as an important aspect of 
achieving a more sustainable groundwater management. This paper focuses on analyzing the  
impacts of a specific groundwater policy well drilling moratoria have on the timing of 
farmers’ decisions on well drilling based on observations in the nine NRDs using survival 
analysis. In the context of agricultural irrigation adoption studies, we consider  
the factors that affect such decision involve economic, agronomic, climate, technology 
development and political variables, and farmers’ irrigation decisions depends on more than a 
single observation of these variables at the time of adoption, but the accumulation of  
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observations over the prior periods. Therefore, the strength of survival analysis over 
conventional bivariate method is that it captures the dynamic elements of the adoption 
process. 
We find strong evidence for farmers’ strategic responses toward a well drilling 
moratorium. Farmers’ well drilling behaviors after the policy implementation are 
significantly reduced but not perfectly eliminated due to the fact that some of the NRDs only 
partially implemented well drilling moratoria in some counties; however, as farmers find out 
a moratorium is about to be implemented in their NRD in the future, farmers start to respond 
to such policy intervention by drilling more irrigation wells at least a year before the actual 
implementation as demonstrated by the pre-policy dummy variable and also by Figure 5. In 
addition, policy spillover effect as demonstrated by the neighboring NRDs dummy based on 
the results from Table 2 (1995-2017) shows that farmers are more likely to drill a new 
irrigation well if any of their neighboring NRDs implements either a partial or a full 
moratorium.  
We also identify significant impacts from corn revenue differential between dryland 
and irrigated land production and soil characteristics, which reclaim the importance of these 
variables in determining farmers’ irrigation decisions. In addition, results from Table 3 
(1960-1995) illuminate the greater impacts from each exogenous variable, such as economic 
and agronomic factors. While the findings are not unexpected, and some of the variables do 
not demonstrate expected relationships, it reiterated the importance of considering included 
variables when analyzing farmers’ irrigation decisions.  
 There are some policy implications based on the results. Well drilling moratoria tends 
to reduce well implementations by each NRD, and the different timing of policy 
implementations in each NRD demonstrates the sole authorization each NRD has for 
appropriate local groundwater resource management. However, both policy spillover effect 
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and farmers’ preemptive behaviors lead to a significantly increased probability of drilling a 
new well by 77% and 62%, respectively, make the moratorium less effective than we expect, 
comparing to a 21% reduction in the probability of drilling a well after the moratorium is 
implemented. Thus, understanding farmers’ strategic responses in terms of a policy change is 
important for a better policy design.  
Some limitations of this study include the lack of more complete variables selections 
due to data availability. For example, data on energy costs that are associated with irrigation 
in Nebraska such as natural gas and diesel are only available at state-level, which restricts the 
inclusion of such variable that are important to farmers’ irrigation decisions. Thus, choosing 
different variables, such as depth to water levels to capture costs associated with irrigation 
results in a better estimation of factors that determine farmers’ decisions. In addition, 
investigating variables that measure farmers and farm characteristics over time are also worth 
exploring their effects on farmers’ irrigation decisions.  
 
 
 
  
  
 
23 
 
 
9     References 
Aiken, D.J. (1980). “Nebraska Groundwater Law and Administration”. Nebraska Law
 Review 59(4): 917-999.   
Alcon, F., Miguel, M.D., and Burton, M. (2011). “Duration Analysis of Adoption of Drip
 Irrigation Technology in Southeastern Spain”. Technological Forecasting and Social
 Change 78(6): 991-1001.  
Burton et. al.(2003). “Modelling the Adoption of Organic Horticultural Technology in the 
UK using Duration Analysis”. The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics 47(1): 29-54.  
Caswell, M.F. and Zilberman, D. (1986). “The Effects of Well Depth and Land Quality on
 the Choice of Irrigation Technology”. American Journal of Agricultural Economics
 64(4):798-9811. 
Carey, J.M. and Zilberman, D. (2002). “A Model of Investment Under Uncertainty: Modern
 Irrigation Technology and Emerging Markets in Water”. American Agricultural
 Economics Association 84(1): 171-183.  
Green, G., Sunding, D., Zilberman, D. and Parker, D. (1996). “Explaining Irrigation
 Technology Choices: A Microparameter Approach”. American Journal of
 Agricultural Economics 78: 1064-1072. 
Johnson, B.B. (1986). “The Changing Structure of Agriculture in Nebraska”. Publication of
 Center for Public Affair Research. 
Knowler, D. and Bradshaw, B. (2006). “Farmers’ Adoption of Conservation Agriculture: A
 Review and Synthesis of Recent research”. Food Policy 32 (1): 25-48.  
List, J.A., Margolis, M. and Osgood, D.E.(2006). “Is the Endangered Species Act
 Endangering Species”. NBER Working Paper Series.  
  
 
24 
 
 
Langpap, C., Kerkvliet, J. and Shogren, J.F.(2018). “The Economics of the U.S. Endangered
 Species Act: A Review of Recent Developments”. Review of Environmental
 Economics and Policy 12(1): 69-91.  
Moore, D. (2016). “Applied Survival Analysis Using R”. 2nd ed. Switzerland: Springer.
 Available at: https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-31245-3.  
Negri, D.H. and Brooks D.H. (1990). “Determinants of Irrigation Technology Choice”.
 Western Journal of Agricultural Economics 15(2): 213-223.  
NRD Groundwater Regulations Across Nebraska (2014). Upper Big Blue Natural Resources
 District. http://www.lbbnrd.net/NRD%20Groundwater%20Rules.pdf [Accessed April
 22, 2018].  
Nebraska Natural Resources Districts. https://www.nrdnet.org/.  
Powell, T.N. and Landers, S. (1979). “Center Pivot Irrigation in Nebraska: An Institutional
 Analysis Case Study”. Biological Systems Engineering. 
Peck, J.C. (2007). “Groundwater Management in the High Plains Aquifer in the USA: Legal
 Problems and Innovations”. The Agricultural Groundwater Revolution: Opportunities 
 and Threats to Development, pages 296-319.  
PRISM Climate Group. Oregon State University.http://www.prism.oregonstate.edu/normals/.  
Stephenson, K. (1996). “Groundwater Management in Nebraska: Governing the Commons
 through Local Resource Districts”. Natural Resources Journal 36(4): 761-778.  
Sophocleous, M. (2010). “Review: Groundwater Management Practices, Challenges, and 
innovations in the High Plains Aquifer, USA—Lessons and Recommended Actions”.
 Hydrogeology Journal 18(3): 559–575.  
Savage, J.A. (2011). “Essays on the Spatially Dynamic Interaction of Individual Behavior,
 Institutions, and the Environment”. PhD dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana
 Champaign.  
  
 
25 
 
 
Sampson, G. and Perry, E. (2018). “The Role of Peer Effects in Natural Resource
 Appropriation-The Case of Groundwater”. American Journal Agricultural
 Economics0(0) : 1-18.  
Therneau et.al.(2018). “Using Time Dependent Covariates and Time Dependent Coefficients
 in the Cox Model”. Mayo Clinic.  
Thomas, L. and Reyes, E.M. (2014). “Tutorial: Survival Estimation for Cox Regression
 Model with Time-Varying Coefficients Using SAS and R”. Journal of Statistical
 Software 61: 1-23.  
USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service. SSURGO Soil Survey. 
 https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/soils/survey/ 
Westra, J.V and Olson, K.D. (1997). “Farmers’ Decision Processes and Adoption of
 Conservation Tillage”. Staff Papers 13380. Department of Applied Economics, 
University of Minnesota.  
Water: The Issue of the Decade. University of Nebraska Lincoln.  
http://ppc.unl.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Water-Issues-Backgrounder
 FINAL.pdf [Accessed April 22, 2018].  
2017 Nebraska Groundwater Quality Monitoring Report (Nov 2017). Nebraska Department
 of Environmental Quality.
 https://nebraskalegislature.gov/FloorDocs/105/PDF/Agencies/Environmental_Quality
 __Department_of/66_20171129-105246.pdf [Accessed April 22, 2018].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
26 
 
 
 
10     Tables & Figures 
 
 
 
 
       Figure 1 Well Registrations by Year in Nebraska (1950-2017) 
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Figure 2 Well Registrations in Republican River Basin NRDs 
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Figure 3 The nine studied NRDs in Nebraska 
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Figure 4 Well registrations by Year in Nebraska (top) and cumulative implementations 
over time (bottom) in the nine NRDs (1995-2017) 
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Figure 5 Well Registrations and policy implementation by NRDs (1995-2017) 
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Figure 6 Well Implementation Per Year during 1960-1995 
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Figure 7 Climate Trend during the period of 1960-1995  
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Table 1 Summary Statistics 
Variable (units) Definition N Mean St. D Min Max 
Total Wells 
(1950-2017) 
Number of wells in 
each NRD 
33,493 3,618 2,229 727 8,261 
Total Wells 
(1995-2017) 
Number of wells in 
each NRD 
5,010 572 371 95 1,246 
Sand Percentage  Percentage of sand 
in soil components 
 
70,525 39.7 31.3 5.0 96.0 
Clay Percentage   Percentage of clay 
in soil components 
70,525 18.8 9.5 2.0 39.9 
Silt Percentage   Percentage of silt 
in soil components 
70,525 41.5 22.9 0.6 73.0 
Average Water 
Capacity (%) 
Amount of water a 
soil can store 
70,525 20.5 6.9 4.8 34.5 
Slope (%) Soil Slope 70,525 7.0 6.2 0.0 44.0 
Policy 
Implementation 
Year 
Implementation year 
of Well-Drilling 
Moratorium in NRDs 
9 2003 2.8 1997 2006 
Precipitationt 
(mm) 
Monthly total 
precipitation during 
growing seasons 
98,164 17.3 3.2 8.9 29.7 
Average 
Maximum 
Temperaturet(C) 
Monthly maximum 
temperature during 
growing seasons 
98,164 26.1 0.8 23.2 29.7 
Corn Revenue 
Differentialt 
($/bu) 
Corn revenue 
differential between 
dryland and irrigated 
land 
873 314.1 120.9 103.1 741.1 
Note: Observations on exogenous variables are shown for the period of 1995-2017 and are 
recorded as five-year moving average values. t = time dependent variable.  
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Table 2 Regression Results for 1995-2017 
Regression Results   
  
Coefficient Hazard Ratio 
Precipitation -0.016 (0.010) 1.0041 
Average maximum temperature -0.476*** (0.041) 0.6727 
Corn revenue differential 0.0005 (0.0004) 1.0014 
Sand percentage 0.028*** (0.004) 1.0362 
Silt percentage 0.035*** (0.006) 1.0467 
Slope -0.002 (0.003) 1.0036 
Available water capacity 0.014* (0.008) 1.0302 
Neighboring NRDs dummy 0.437*** (0.067) 1.7656 
Pre-policy dummy 0.365*** (0.061) 1.6215 
Post-policy dummy -0.443*** (0.106) 0.7896 
Observations 1,281,034  
R2 0.004  
Max. Possible R2 0.079  
Log Likelihood -50,019.700  
Wald Test 4,663.010*** (df = 18)  
LR Test 5,734.792*** (df = 18)  
Score (Logrank) Test 7,492.773*** (df = 18)    
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01  
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Table 3 Regression Results for 1960-1995 
 
Regression Results   
  
Coefficient Hazard ratio 
Precipitation 0.045*** (0.007) 1.0465 
Average maximum temperature -0.073*** (0.022) 0.9292 
Corn revenue differential 0.001*** (0.0002) 1.0014 
Sand percentage 0.027*** (0.002) 1.0278 
Silt percentage 0.029*** (0.003) 1.0290 
Slope -0.004* (0.001) 0.9964 
Available water capacity 0.026*** (0.004) 1.0261 
Observations 2,264,598  
R2 0.006  
Max. Possible R2 0.160  
Log Likelihood -191,556.900  
Wald Test 11,898.360*** (df = 15)   
LR Test 12,934.720*** (df = 15)  
Score (Logrank) Test 15,910.830*** (df = 15)   
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
